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Abstract: Joseph Schumpeter and Hyman Minsky have devoloped, during their lives, both a theory 
of the business cycles and a theory of capitalist development. Minsky was influenced by Schumpeter 
during the period he spent at Harvard University in 1942 and he thought that Schumpeter vision of 
the capitalist process required an integration of financial markets and investment behaviour: roughtly 
speaking, Minsky’s financial keynesianism was what Schumpeter needed to complete his own theory 
of the devoloping of a capitalist economy. Minsky explored an even broader historical framework 
during the last decade of his life: the theory of capitalist development along the idea that there are 
many types of capitalism. As pointed out by Whalen (2001) to analyse each stage of capitalist 
development following Minsky’s perspective, one  should ask what is the distinctive activity being 
financed, what is the pivotal source of financing, and what is the balance of economic power between 
those in business and in banking/finance activity. Capitalist development is shaped by the institutional 
structure, but this structure is always evolving in response to profit-seeking activity. The financial 
system takes on special importance in this theory not only because finance exerts a strong influence 
on business activity but also because this system is particularly prone to innovation. In this paper, I 
shall focus particularly on this analysis trying to up-date his taxonomy, taking into account the process 
of global financialisation, and comparing it with Schumpeter’s previous scrutinity on the evolution 
of capitalism. 
 
Prepared for ESHET Conference, University Complutense, Madrid and updated for the 






"Whereas all capitalisms are flawed, not 
all capitalisms are equally flawed" 







Joseph Schumpeter and Hyman Minsky have devoloped, during their lives, both a theory of the 
business cycles (cf. Schumpeter, 1939; Minsky, 1982) and a theory of capitalist development 
(Schumpeter,1934, 1942; Minsky, 1990a; 1990b; Minsky, 1993a). According to Schumpeter indeed 
the dynamic of a capitalistic economy is generated by the innovative process. This process does not 
unfold in continuous and uniform manner, but  through a periodic succession of cycles (Schumpeter, 
1939). Minsky was influenced by Schumpeter during the period he spent at Harvard University in 
19421 and he thought that Schumpeter vision of the capitalist process required an integration of 
financial markets and investment behaviour: roughtly speaking, Minsky’s financial keynesianism was 
what Schumpeter needed to complete his own theory of the devoloping of a capitalist economy. The 
point raised by Minsky is important because it relies on chapters in Schumpeter’s book titled “The 
Theory of Economic Development” (1934) that were often overlooked by many economists. In this 
book, Schumpeter considered indeed money, credit and finance as essential to the innovation process 
promoted by the entrepreneurs (cf. Knell, 2015). 
Minsky has developed the so-called “Wall Street” paradigm, a financial theory of investment2 and 
the often cited financial instability hypothesis (FIH) (Minsky, 1976; 1982). These contributions, and 
his subsequent writings, have all received significant attention in recent years due to the recent 
financial crisis conceived as a “Minsky moment”.Nevertheless Minsky explored an even broader 
historical framework during the last decade of his life: the theory of capitalist development along the 
idea that there are many types of capitalism (cf. the epigraph). In this paper, I shall focus particularly 
on this analysis trying to up-date his taxonomy and comparing it with Schumpeter’s (1942) previous 
scrutinity on the evolution of capitalism. 
The paper is structured thus: in section 1, I try to describe how Schumpeter’s vision on the evolution 
of capitalism was the purposes behind Minsky's exploration of a theory of capitalist development. In 
section 2, Minsky’s theory is then outlined and compared with Schumpeter’s scrutinity on the topic, 
with particularly regards to his 1934 and 1942 books. Section 3 takes into account the process of 
current financialization and its impact on entrepreneurship; Section 4 puts under scrutiny the threats 
                                                          
1Minsky began indeed his doctoral dissertation research under Schumpeter who untimely death in early 1950.  For this 
reason Minsky’s PhD was finished (1954) under the supervision of Leontief. 
2 On the importance of the financial factors for corporate investment in Minsky, see: Eichner and Kregel, 1975; Skott, 
1989; Crotty, 1990, 1992; Lavoie, 2014; Davis, 2017. 
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for financial stability link to the financial globalization reported by Minsky since ‘90s. Finally, I 
summarize my conclusions.   
 
1. Schumpeter on the evolution of capitalism  
 
Schumpeter identified innovation as the critical dimension of economic change. He argued that 
economic change revolves around innovation, entrepreneurial activities, and market power. He 
sought to prove that innovation-originated market power can provide better results than the invisible 
hand and price competition. He argued that technological innovation often creates temporary 
monopolies, allowing abnormal profits that would soon be competed away by rivals and imitators.  
Schumpeter was probably the first scholar to theorize about entrepreneurship, and the field owed 
much to his contributions. Schumpeter argued that the innovation and technological change of a 
nation come from the entrepreneurs. He coined the word Unternehmergeist, German for 
"entrepreneur-spirit", and asserted that "... the doing of new things or the doing of things that are 
already being done in a new way" stemmed directly from the efforts of entrepreneurs. 
Once the entrepreneur has been defined in general terms, the question arises as to who really puts on 
the entrepreneurial functions in what historically has been termed as capitalist economy and that, in 
fact is the kind of economic order which specifically concerns Schumpeter. Related to this there is 
another question, who are the beneficiaries of the profit in this order of economy. The latter question 
is related to the former but is not identical to it because as the role of the entrepreneur is essential to 
generate the profit the entrepreneur may not be the receiver of the profit. 
In order to answer these questions one should keep in mind that for Schumpeter innovation generally 
means construction of new plants or, at least, a radical transformation of the old plants. It is absolutely 
not indispensable but it should be considered that the innovations which do not follow what has been 
said earlier are innovations of minor relevance and do not characterise the process of development. 
The creation of the new plants can come up either through birth of new firms or through expansion 
of old firms. In this regards Schumpeter distinguishes between two stages of development of 
capitalism, the first named “competitive capitalism” and the second “trustified capitalism”. The first 
stage is characterised not by excessively big firms in relation to the market dimension and here the 
introduction of innovation generally means the creation of new firms. Instead, in the second stage big 
firms become more diffused and these firms are capable of sustaining the innovative process within 
their own set up so that innovations do not help the birth of new firms which, then, compete with the 
old ones.  
Having said that and given the fact that the identification of an entrepreneur is never an easy task 
because no one is just an entrepreneur and nor is he in a perfectly continuous manner, Schumpeter 
points out that in the period of competitive capitalism entrepreneurial function is generally carried 
out by the proprietors of the firms themselves.  
However the question becomes much more complex in the era of dominance of big firms in which 
the entrepreneurial function can either be performed by someone who controls the firm, in a joint 
stock company by the proprietor of majority of shares or by those who are responsible for running 
the firm or even by ordinary staffs and can reside in a single person or in a collective body.  
Once the profit has been generated whether it is received by the entrepreneur or not is a matter of 
institutional nature. In case of family firms the profit is received by the same people who have 
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performed the entrepreneurial activity, and in this case, it, generally, constitutes the origin of those 
great fortunes upon which industrial dynasties are founded. In the industrial system based on the big 
joint stock companies, instead, the profit, as such, belongs to the firm and its distribution becomes a 
question of company’s policy: it can be received by the shareholders, or by the board of directors or 
even by the staffs and workers, independently of the fact that who actually has carried out the 
entrepreneurial act. Despite the vagueness of the problem about who receives the profit it is a well 
established fact that for Schumpeter the profit cannot be the reward for the risk as has been often 
believed by other economists. Schumpeter points out that the risk is taken by the capitalist and not by 
the entrepreneur, and the entrepreneur takes the risk only in so far as he is also the owner of the 
capital.If one were to accept that innovations are incorporated in new plants, immediately arises the 
problem that how such innovations would be financed. At steady state every firm finances its 
operations by using current revenue.  
However, the entrepreneur who has to construct the plant in which his innovations would be realised 
needs a new purchasing power, not existing before, through which he will acquire the possibility of 
controlling certain productive resources which are diverted from old uses and employed for the new 
uses as suggested by the innovation. This availability of new means of payment (by money (notes or 
deposits) manufactured for that purpose) is achieved by credit which according to Schumpeter is the 
other fundamental characteristic of the economic development.  
Schumpeter thought that bankers stands between those who wish to form new combinations and the 
possessors of productive means. Banking activity indeed makes possible “the carrying out of new 
combinations, authorises people, in the name of society as it were, to form them. He is the ephor of 
the exchange economy (Schumpeter 1934, 74)3. 
As in the planned economy the realization of the innovative process would require an order from the 
planning authority to divert the productive resources from their current use to the new service, 
likewise in capitalist economy the credit performs analogous function in the hands of the entrepreneur 
because it allows the entrepreneur to utilize a part of the wealth of the system to his own ends. In the 
logic of Schumpeterian system the possibility that saving may preceed investment has to be discarded, 
as saving does not exist or in a steady state exists in negligible measure: in fact the main source where 
it is formed is nothing but the profits taken away from diffusion process determined by the 
competitors. It is clear, therefore, that including saving among the factors that give kick-start to 
development it would include in the premises part of what is needed to be explained. In other words 
financing investments for the innovations outside the loan business is a phenomenon that belongs to 
an already developed system.  
Schumpeter cautions against considering this logical order to correspond necessarily to the historical 
succession. If credit creation by the banking system, logically, is the beginning of the capitalist 
process, this does not also assign it an historical priority. In fact, it should be kept in account that 
historically in the beginning of the capitalistic development firms were sufficiently small so that they 
could be financed by means coming from the formation of the saving by the preceding economic 
systems. 
                                                          
3 The Ephors were elected magistrates who supervised the kings in Sparta, so Schumpeter’s analogy is with bankers 
effectively deciding which‘new combinations’ will beformed. They act indeed as “social accountants”. 
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Probably it can be said that for Schumpeter this initial stage of “primitive financing”, in the capitalistic 
system that has developed historically, has been followed by other two stages as suggested by his 
distinction between “competitive capitalism” and “trustified capitalism”.  
The first would correspond to the great development of the credit system which manifests through 
the complete deployment of its essential function, financing the innovations. Naturally there exist on 
the one hand secondary functions of the credit system (financing the current business transactions) 
and on the other utilization of the saving coming from internal funds-revenue (profits) for financing 
the entrepreneurial activities; but the fundamental characteristic of the period in question would 
remain the fact that the bank continuously recreates in the system the financial terms of development 
facing systematic annulment, by competitors, of the dynamic revenue. In the second stage, albeit on 
a different level and decidedly in different conditions, some characteristics of the initial stage is 
somehow reproduced, at least, in the sense that the development and consolidation of firms of ever 
growing dimensions and the reinforcement of all the direct methods to hamper the competitor’s 
performance are a phenomenon that tends to stabilize permanent sources of saving within the firms 
themselves and, therefore, to relegate the bank within the limits of its secondary function. 
Schumpeter began the first edition of “The Theory of Economic Development” (1934), by describing 
the circulation of money and real goods and services in terms of a ‘Kreislauf’ or monetary circuit, but 
alludes to the importance of credit money at the end of the first chapter. Schumpeter considered 
money to be analogous to capital as bank deposits allow them to give credit to producers for their 
purchases of circulating capital goods. Still, Schumpeter (1934:107) took this idea one step further 
claiming “credit is essentially the creation of purchasing power for the purpose of transferring it to 
the entrepreneur.” The availability of credit creates allows entrepreneurs to gain access to investment 
goods necessary for innovation “before they have acquired the normal claim to it.” Schumpeter 
reasoned that money was credit-driven and determined endogenously by the demand for bank loans 
by entrepreneurs engaged in innovative activities. Entrepreneurs not only had an insatiable desire to 
gain profit through innovation, but the could finance new innovations through endogenous money 
creation. 
The Schumpeterian distinction between “competitive capitalism” and “trustified capitalism” serves 
in clarifying another important question for economic theory; it concerns the definition itself of the 
concepts of competition and monopoly. So for Schumpeter the real competition that takes place in 
the capitalist economy is not which is practised between small firms which produce the same goods 
but is that which innovative firms, those in which entrepreneurial activity is carried out, practise with 
respect to other firms; it is not the competition between identical goods, all of them produced in the 
same way, but is that which new products do to the old ones or the new productive processes do to 
the old ones. This competitive process has been called by Schumpeter the process of “creative 
destruction”, a term which emphasises that the actual competition comes about by the effects that the 
innovations have on the existing firms. 
This concept of competition carries with itself a concept of monopoly, even this being different from 
the traditional one. First thing to be noted is that the concept of innovation inevitably results to some 
degree of monopoly: before innovation is being diffused it is monopoly of the entrepreneur and the 
profit that he receives is due to this monopoly. According to Schumpeter the transition from 
competitive capitalism to trustified capitalism, i.e. the transition from a phase in which innovations 
generally are incorporated with the new firms to a phase in which innovations prevalently are carried 
out by the existing firms, doesn’t result either into an intensity reduction of the economic growth or 
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in the deterioration of its quality, instead, it may be surmised that during such transition the growth 
might even be accentuated.  
Schumpeter, therefore, rejects the thesis, advanced by many and about which we will need to talk 
about later, according to whom capitalism is destined to a final crisis for reasons related only to its 
economic mechanism. Rather he is convinced that it would be impossible for capitalism to survive 
but this conviction is based also on non-economic considerations.  
While a professor at Harvard Schumpeter then developed his theory of capitalist development and he 
discussed on the fate of capitalism. Many economists and political scientists of the day argued that 
large businesses had a negative effect on the standard of living of ordinary people. Contrary to this 
prevailing opinion, Schumpeter argued that the agents that drive innovation and the economy are 
large companies which have the capital to invest in research and development of new products and 
services and to deliver them to customers more cheaply, thus raising their standard of living. 
In Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942, 123), Schumpeter wrote: “As soon as we go into 
details and inquire into the individual items in which progress was most conspicuous, the trail leads 
not to the doors of those firms that work under conditions of comparatively free competition but 
precisely to the door of the large concerns – which, as in the case of agricultural machinery, also 
account for much of the progress in the competitive sector – and a shocking suspicion dawns upon us 
that big business may have had more to do with creating that standard of life than with keeping it 
down”. 
Nevertheless, as had been mentioned earlier for Schumpeter capitalist economy is destined to undergo 
a period of final crisis that calls for a transition to different forms of economic organisation. In this 
sense the position of Schumpeter is closer to that of the classics, and particularly to Marx because he 
has in common the idea that the crisis of capitalism is not resolvable in the ambit of capitalism itself, 
while  on the basis of a Keynesian framework one tries to define an economic condition in which a 
relevant and continuous public intervention can keep the system alive, albeit modifying some of its 
characteristics. It has also been said that Schumpeter’s argument are based on considerations which 
are not strictly of economic order but they rather refer to changes in the social structure that result in 
capitalism deriving from the mechanism of its own evolution.  
The Schumpeterian thesis – presented in 1942 in his work “Capitalism socialism and democracy”- is 
essentially based on the the evolution of the economic and social environment in the last stages of 
capitalism. The relevant increase of the size of the firms, that gives each firm a very large share of 
the overall market, requires business and group planning that makes bearable the serious risks. These 
risks derive from the close dependence of the efficiency of the productive development that takes 
place at a point in the economic system from what happens in the rest of the system itself. This 
basically means that the formation of capital becomes more and more controlled by the workings of 
the management boards rather than the initiatives of individual entrepreneurs. In other words, the 
close relation that existed at the beginning of capitalism between the single entrepreneur and 
innovation is snapped; the innovation itself is being reduced to a routine process; the economic 
process tends to become depersonalised and automatized.  
In the society, then, the entrepreneurial function, conceived individualistically loses its importance 
and move towards managerial capitalism4. But, as forecast by Schumpeter, there exists a second 
                                                          
4 This aspect has been pointed out also by Minsky (see section 3). 
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reason of the weakening of the entrepreneurial activity when the capitalistic economy achieves a 
certain state of development. 
In highly developed societies  there was a tendency to systematically permit forms of intervention 
and acts of economic policies which tended either to a strong increase the public investment as part 
of the overall investments or to a redistributive process which in the end had the effect of rescheduling 
the distribution of income between consumption and savings in favour of consumption (consider, for 
example, the huge programmes of social security). 
This kind of evolution may be justifiable on the basis of Keynesian considerations: it is a matter of 
complex indispensable policies to maintain the effective demand to a sufficient level to guarantee a 
high level of employment. But what Schumpeter draws from it, is that the accumulation of capital, in 
the ambit of private economic activity, is becoming less important for the development of the system, 
as a result the position, related evidently to the accumulation, of the private entrepreneur becomes 
less and less important.  
As Schumpeter maintains, if the full deployment of entrepreneurial activity on a private and 
individualistic basis is the essential connotation of capitalism, developments mentioned earlier lead 
in the long-run, to a profound transformation. This aspect is considered irreversible by Schumpeter 
as regards an economic system in which the capitalist class gets weaker and weaker, approaching the 
economy in a planned form which he believes, if not desirable, certainly perfectly possible: ‘a socialist 
form of society will inevitably emerge from an equally inevitable decomposition of capitalist society’ 
Schumpeter (1942, p. 129).  
 
2. The influence of Schumpeter on Minsky’s theory of capitalist development 
 
As outlined in the introduction, Minsky’s theoretical analysis has the merit to stand on the shoulders 
of two intellectual giants. As well-known his writings on business cycles made considerable use of 
the prior works by Keynes. However (cf. Whalen, 1999 and 2001) that is, in the mid-1980s, he became 
convinced that the structure of the U.S. economy and of devoloped capitalist economies have so 
fundamentally changed that an analysis of structural evolution was essential.  
It was at this point that Minsky turned to the insights of his Harvard’s mentor: Joseph Schumpeter. 
In a 1986 essay, Minsky (1986c, p. 121, quoted by Whalen, 1999) wrote: "The task confronting 
economics today may be characterized as a need to integrate Schumpeter's vision of a resilient 
intertemporal capitalist process with Keynes' hard insights into the fragility introduced into the 
capitalist accumulation process by some inescapable properties of capitalist financial structures." 
Minsky believed that such an integration was possible because Schumpeter and Keynes (along with 
Marx and the institutionalists) had a common perception of the task of economics. From this 
perspective, the economy is a complex, time-dependent system5. 
                                                          
5 If the first element in Minsky's theory is the focus on economic activity as a process in time, then the second element is 
that capitalist dynamics can take many forms. The path of the economy through time can be progressive, stagnant or 




A fundamental determinant of the particular path of capitalist development is the economy's 
institutional structure. It is this structure that facilitates, influences, regulates and constrains economic 
activity. Moreover, given the notion of the economy as an evolving system, Minsky also stressed the 
dynamic nature of the institutional structure. Like Schumpeter, Minsky's recognition of historical 
time caused him to emphasize that production precedes exchange--and that finance precedes 
production. Thus, credit and finance are, in compliance again with Schumpeter’s analysis, at the 
center of capitalist development. Moreover, because credit is essential to the process of development, 
a theory of economic development needs to integrate it into its basic formulation: "the in-place 
financial structure is a central determinant of the behavior of a capitalist economy" (Minsky 1993a, 
106)6.  
The profit motive was also an essential element in Minsky's writings, he had long argued that present 
and prospective profits influence economic activity within the context of a given institutional 
structure--and that the structure itself changes in response to profit seeking. As Minsky gave 
increasing attention to capitalist development, profit-driven structural change took on increasing 
importance. In previous section I have already recognized Schumpeterian forces of creation and 
destruction in products and manufacturing processes. But Minsky emphasized that Schumpeter also 
gave attention to changes in financial systems. As a result, Minsky's theory stresses that financial 
markets evolve not only in response to profit-driven demands of business leaders and individual 
investors but also as a result of the profit-seeking activity by banks and  financial firms (cf. Minsky 
1986b; Minsky 1990a; Minsky 1993a).  
Minsky (1957a), was indeed concerned with “profit-seeking activities” that drives “evolutionary 
changes in financial institutions”, which then leads to the endogenous creation of money. He claimed 
that it was almost impossible to control monetary aggregates because of financial innovations and 
new financial instruments. Later, Minsky (1986b: 120) recapped the origin of this idea: the 
Schumpeterian vision of the experimenting entrepreneur who innovates need but be extended to 
financial firms and their clients to explain why portfolios migrate to a brink at which a shortfall of 
cash flows or a rise in financing terms may lead to a market revision of asset values. Here Minsky 
linked Schumpeter’s idea of the innovating entrepreneur with that of financial innovations produced 
by financial institutions. Minsky (1993 p….) concluded: “Nowhere is evolution, change and 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurship more evident than in banking and finance and nowhere is the drive 
for profits more clearly a factor in making for change”. Financial innovation is then another essential 
element in Minsky's theory since such innovation is a crucial determinant of institutional evolution. 
In his thought, financial structure is neither neutral, nor dichotomic on the real sector of the economy, 
financial evolution plays indeed a crucial role in the dynamic patterns of the economy. 
 
3. Minsky’s theory of capitalist evolution 
 
As I stressed in the previous section, Minsky's theory of capitalist development is finance-driven, and 
the relations between finance and investment are given center stage. The stages are related to what is 
financed and who does the proximate financing. Following Whalen’s (1999) taxonomy, Minsky's  
                                                          
6 On this topic see also the relevant book by Hilferding (1910 reprint 1981). 
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capitalism varieties may identify at least five stages — and we might now be on the verge of creating 
a sixth. The five stages can be labeled as follows:  
merchant capitalism (1607-1813),  
industrial capitalism (1813-1890),  
banker capitalism (1890-1933),  
managerial capitalism (1933-1982),  
and money-manager capitalism (1982-present).   
Merchant capitalism emerged from European feudal society and took root in America with 
establishment of British colonies in the 1600s. The distinct activity to be financed were production 
and transportation of goods, acquisition of inventories. The pivotal source of financing was provided 
by merchant banking  and commercial banking.  The main instrument of this stage was a bill of 
exchange or other instruments that relate credits to specific commodities. Such a bill is drawn on a 
banker and assert that the banker garatees that the receiver of goods will pay the shipper.  As regards 
the entity to be financed it was characterized by owner-managed enterprises--usually proprietorships 
or partnerships--with few employees and often few transactions per day. Merchant capitalism was 
undermined by growing population and by the arrival of the industrial revolution. Minsky stressed 
also attention to the profit motive, since  profit was the driving force for individuals whose names 
have become synonymous with the arrival and expansion of industrial capitalism.  
As to industrial capitalism it was characterized by the fact that the distinctive activity to be financed, 
due to industrial expansion, were factories manufacturing, capital-intensive transportation, mills, and 
mines. The main source of financing was through the activity of investment banking like J. P.Morgan.  
This stage saw the seeds also of the New York Stock Exchange. As regards the fundamental entreprise 
financed, the partnership gave way to the industrial corporation. The industrial revolution led to a 
great increase in the importance of machinery in production and therefore on non-labour costs that 
prices had to cover.  
Banker capitalism was established when investment bankers responded to cutthroat competition in 
the 1880s and 1890s. Its arrival is characterized by investment bankers turning their attention toward 
the financing of industrial consolidation (cartels, trusts and mergers). Indeed, there was a merger 
wave in its aftermath. Private economic power, in this stage, had become greatly concentrated: 
financiers and managers exerted their own formidable force during banker capitalism — at both the 
enterprises and industry levels. Taylorism as the new "scientific" techniques (inspired by Frederick 
Winslow Taylor) combined assembly-line production and enabled managers to generate significant 
increases in factory output. The group that holds the greatest economic power was represented by 
investment bankers since they acquired a controlling position in the economy arranging mergers but 
also by securing large ownership shares and seats on the boards of directors of newly combined 
corporations. 
The transition from banker capitalism to managerial capitalism was driven by the Great Depression 
since it made manifest the need for public economic policies to stabilize economic activity in the face 
of the Great downturn. This downturn was even getting worse in the aggregate, since individual 
bankers, businesses and farmers did anything except cut loans, slash prices, reduce employment, and 
increase agricultural yields. The New Deal by Franklin Roosevelt shift the distinctive activity 
financed through a series of policies and reforms that ushered in the next stage of U.S. capitalist 
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development macroeconomic growth and stability. Bold government action in the realm of monetary 
and fiscal policies along regulation of the banking activity (the Emergency Banking Act, banks 
reorganizations, and institutional reform including deposit insurance, securities regulation, and 
compartmentalization of financial institutions). The Glass-Steagall Act (1933) contained institutional 
innovations that avoided a complete breakdown of the financial system and massive debt deflation 
by providing a strict separation between commercial and investment banking.  
The so-called managerial capitalism saw corporate  managers running giant corporations, and the 
pursuit of corporate growth was regarded as the major aim of firms (Stockhammer, 2004b). The 
institutional settings that enabled this process were, however, historically specific to the Fordist 
accumulation regime which characterised the so-called Golden Age between the end of World War 
II and the early 70s. And, as already stressed, they were largely the direct consequence of the 
institutional arrangements that followed the crisis of 1929. In the 1930s, indeed, Governments over 
the world, have progressively been aware of the dynamics that has led to the financial crisis. This is 
the reason why they severely limited the influence of financial capital, ending up by reinforcing the 
role of corporate management.   
The pivotal source of financing was through the Central Bank. As regards the fundamental entity 
financed it regarded the private sector broadly speaking financed through the banking system and 
conglomerate form was dominant in the market. Unfurtunately  the financial system evolved versus 
a more fragile situation characterize by a reductions in margins of safety a greater reliance on debt 
financing, and a turn toward short-term financing.  
These were the seeds for the stage that followed represented by money-manager capitalism. 
Characterized by an explosion of activity by finance companies and other non-bank financial 
institutions--as well as a steady stream of bank innovations such as the securitization of loans and the 
creative use of off-balance sheet commitments. But one of the major innovation in the financial 
system in this period (i.e. 1980s) was the rise of managed-money funds--pension funds, mutual funds, 
bank trust funds, and so on. Over time, such funds accumulated vast amounts of money. Money-
manager capitalism is characterized not only by a substantial growth of financial assets but by the 
shift of responsibility for holding and managing those assets to mutual and pension funds (Minsky, 
1996). The ownership of financial instruments by dozy of shareholders has been supplanted by the 
professional, eagle-eyed money managers.  
Fear of wealth losses promoted by inflation damaging upon bank deposits also contributed to the 
increase in managed-money funds. As this stage progressed, "individual wealth holdings increasingly 
took the form of ownership of the liabilities of managed funds rather than the holding of a portfolio 
of the liabilities of individual businesses" (Minsky 1993a, 110-111, quoted by Whalen, 1999, p. 12). 
Money-manager capitalism stemmed since the 1980s (and, as I shall to argue later, characterizes our 
times), as institutional investors, by then the largest repositories of savings in developed countries, 
began to exert their influence on financial markets and business enterprises. The aim of money 
managers is the maximization of the value of the investments made by fund holders. As a result, 
business leaders became increasingly sensitive to short-term profits and the stock-market valuation 
of their firm. In the previous age of managerial capitalism, corporate managers "were the masters”of 
the economy, by the 1980s, money managers became the masters! Minsky knew (as well Keynes 
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(1936; p. 154-55)7 that these aspects would lead to greater instability of financial markets. He then 
concentrated on the effect of this new power of the money managers in increasing the sensitivity of 
firms to stock market valuations and the threat of takeover just at the time when all economies were 
opening up to a wider, world competition (i.e financial globalization). The rise of institutional 
investors encouraged continued financial-system evolution by providing a ready pool of buyers for 
securitized loans, the commercial paper of finance companies, and other innovations. It also fueled 
the trend toward mergers, acquisitions, corporate breakups, leveraged buyouts and stock buybacks- 
since fund managers have a strong incentive to support whatever initiatives promise to boost near-
term portfolio value. These managed-money funds often provided the resources that raiders needed 
to secure corporate control. 
Furthermore in many developed countries during this period, Governments have also promoted the 
evolution of the financial system by removing many regulations imposed after the IInd World War 
(particularly in the US). Tax law changes have also encouraged takeovers, buyouts and other types 
of corporate restructuring (Wolfson 1994, 111-112). This process of deep financialization was tightly 
linked to neo-liberal paradigm as well as to globalization process inspired by Washington Consensus 
(cf. Lavoie, 2012; Sau 2013; 2015). Neoliberals wanted deregulation, privatization, the intensification 
of competition, labor market flexibility, and mechanisms designed to modify the behavior of 
managers. Performance pay became “the in-thing and the best that could be designed was pay 
packages strongly oriented toward stock options. With the stock market value of the firm as the 
ultimate objective, it was said that remuneration of managers ought to be a function of share prices” 
(Lavoie, 2012,p. 217). 
The managerial view of the firm, as described by Schumpeter and Minsky has lost out to the 
shareholder view. The standard story emphasized  that managers of corporations have been forced to 
take the interests of the owners into prime consideration while the shareholder value argument said 
that managers ought to maximize the stock market value of the firm. 
Financialization has meant a change in the way corporations are being run, as well as changes in the 
behavior of economic agents, in the microeconomic and macroeconomic policies being pursued by 
governments and central banks, and in the regime of capital accumulation and the distribution of 
income. Most obviously, it has meant changes in financial regulation through deep deregulation. 
Furthermore, financialization has been accompanied by a series of economic theories (Efficient 
market hypothesis –EMH-) that have justified or fueled this process (Sau, 2013). This process has 
been measured by the evolution in a range of variables, most notably the large rise in the relative 
importance of the finance, insurance, and real estate sectors since the early 1980s, whether measured 
                                                          
7 “It might have been supposed that competition between expert professionals, possessing judgment and knowledge 
beyond that of the average private investor, would correct the vagaries of the ignorant individual left to himself. It happens, 
however, that the energies and skill of the professional investor and speculator are mainly occupied …….with foreseeing 
changes in the conventional basis of valuation a short time ahead of the general public….. Thus the professional investor 
is forced to concern himself with the anticipation of impending changes, in the news or in the atmosphere, of the kind by 
which experience shows that the mass psychology of the market is most influenced. This is the inevitable result of 
investment markets organised with a view to so-called “liquidity”…. This battle of wits to anticipate the basis of 
conventional valuation a few months hence, rather than the prospective yield of an investment over a long term of years, 
does not even require gulls amongst the public to feed the maws of the professional; — it can be played by professionals 
amongst themselves…. Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of enterprise. But the position is 
serious when enterprise becomes the bubble on a whirlpool of speculation…. When the capital development of a country 
becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done”, (Keynes, 1936, Ch 12, p.154-56) 
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in terms of gross domestic product (GDP), profits, or employee compensation. Transactions based on 
financial futures and derivatives have exploded.  
Furthermore, over the last years the financial investment of non-financial businesses has grown 
considerably, as have share buybacks and dividend payout ratios (Ohrhangazi, 2008). It follows that 
the accumulation of real capital has been declining (Stockhammer, 2004; Davis, 2017, Scarano, 
2019). Financialisation, the shareholder revolution and the development of a market for corporate 
control have shift power to shareholders and that changed management priorities, leading to a 
reduction in the desired growth rate8. The process of financialization “was based on weakened labor 
unions, relatively low real wages, high profit shares, high real interest rates, and large capital gains, 
either in the equity or in the real estate market” (Lavoie, 2012, p. 219).  
Minsky (1993a,b) was well aware that, thanks to the massive deregulation process in financial 
markets promoted by the neo-liberal paradigm, money managers have  assumed a crucial position in 
financing mergers and organising hostile takeovers as a device to discipline managers of non-financial 
businesses, and thereby forcing them to follow their interests and objectives. Yet financial investors 
usually have a shorter time horizon than traditional corporations and banks (Stockhammer, 2004b). 
They are interested in short-run returns and therefore tend to underinvest in long-run projects, 
changing the growth strategies of the controlled corporations9.   
While, under the stakeholder view of managerial capitalism, firms often took a long-term view, with 
the generalization of the shareholder model led to short-termism, with the managers being mainly 
concerned on the stock market prices even though large firms do not finance any of their investments 
through stock issues. Unlike the previous stages the emphasis was not on capital development of the 
economy, rather upon quick return of the speculator, upon trading profits. The shareholder model, 
instead of aligning the interest of the managers to those of the owners, induced managers to fool 
actual and would-be shareholders, by messing with the computation of earnings per share (Parenteau, 
2005, p. 128).  
As remarqued by Minsky (1993a) in this stage of capitalism the financiers are not acting as the 
Schumpeter’s ephors of the economy that screen, promote and finance the most profitable projects, 
todays money managers activity is more akin to Keynes’s characterization of the financial 
arrangements of advanced capitalism as the by-product of a casino. 
As I have argued, in the first three post-war decades, the role of shareholders in corporations was 
severely limited by heavily restrictive financial regulation and capital flows control, which were the 
political reactions to the financial and real crisis of the 1930s.  In the 1950s and 1960s, giant 
corporations usually aimed at financial independence through retained earnings. They were able to 
borrow from financial institutions and markets, but were not normally forced to act so and could avoid 
subjection to control by financial corporations and outside shareholders. In this kind of corporations, 
                                                          
8 Stockhammer (2004) has tested this phenomenon empirically, for the USA, the UK, France and Germany. In all 
Countries, evidence supported the negative effect of financialisation on accumulation.  
9 The two typical constraints corporations face are the finance constraint and the profit–growth trade-off.  On the first 
front, according to the pecking order thery, inside and outside finance are really different. In fact, as stressed again by 
Minsky, corporations follow the principle of increasing risk, and then are reluctant to accept high leverage rates, since a 
failure will put their existence at risk. The banks, in turn, take corporate current profit and wealth as proxies for business 
reliability, granting credit only to firms that are profitable. In this way, financing by means of retained profits can become 
a preferential corporate strategy, which ask the company's commitment to maximizing the return on investment for 
potential shareholders. The growth–profit trade-off, instead, takes into account the fact that an increase in investment can 
harm future profits because of the start-up costs of investment or the socalled Penrose effect (increasing managerial costs 
of fast growth).   
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“managers were a self-perpetuating group that identified itself with the corporation and its fate. The 
board of directors and the chief executive officers were “organization men” and the control rested 
securely in their hands. Their major objectives were the corporation market share and its strategic 
positions in the market” (Scarano, 2019, p. 13).   
However, this situation has been changing since the late 1970s, through the progressive erosion of 
financial regulation by means of the invention of new financial instruments, such as junk bonds and 
other high-risk and high-return securities10. By means of this financial deregulation, the financial 
markets have progressively exerted increasing pressure on non-financial corporations (NFCs), by 
means of hostile takeovers first, and then with the “shareholder revolution”, characterised by a 
growing presence of institutional investors within their shareholding (Lowenstein, 2004; Orhangazi, 
2008)11.  
Again according to Stockhammer (2004, 2006), the “shareholder revolution” is one of the main 
features of the present neo-liberal era, which has produced radical changes in corporate behaviour in 
the name of creating “shareholder value.” According to him, this revolution has been the consequence 
of the financial liberalization and the emergence of very liquid share markets in the 1980s and 1990s, 
together with the successive rise in shareholders’ capability to influence public company managers 
by means of the creation of “a market for corporate control”.  The managements of large non-financial 
corporations, in fact, would have committed themselves to increasingly producing shareholder value 
because of the expanded possibilities for financial investors to use the capital market to estimate and 
compare performance of their corporations and to discipline them with the threat of hostile takeovers. 
In this new context, the managers of large corporations could easily be replaced by shareholders if 
corporate performance proved inadequate in creating value for them (Stockhammer, 2006).  
Since ‘90s mutual and pension funds held growing fractions of equity, increasing their ownership 
shares at the expense of cross-shareholdings between non-financial firms. These institutional 
investors allocated capital among industries and firms in a decidedly market-based way, imposing 
profitability norms on enterprises and looking to short-term profit. They exerted their power over the 
management with exit strategies, creating difficulties for the firm to obtain new financing. Their 
arrival unleashed competition for global saving among companies. However, investment funds were 
set up by the banks, especially in Europe (Levine, 2003). Thus, the threat of growing control by large 
financial intermediaries in public companies could be an incentive for managers to change their 
investment behaviours, increasingly orienting them towards short-term profit investment and 
discouraging long-term strategic investments.  
However, this tendency to produce an increasing shareholder value could not only be the result of 
new forms of corporate governance and new financial intermediaries, but rather the traditional way 
to maximise the equity capital self-valorisation in a different competition environment and given new 
                                                          
10 Moreover, up to 1982 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) could counteract massive stock repurchases as 
illegal attempts to manipulate stock prices by the companies. Since the end of 1982, instead, during the deregulation onset 
of the neoliberal phase, the SEC has partially liberalised stock repurchases, provided that they be less than 25% of the 
average daily trading volume over the previous four weeks and the buybacks be carried out at neither the beginning nor 
the end of the trading day (Lazonick, 2013). 
11 As pointed out by Scarano (2019) French regulationists have been emphasising corporate governance since the 1970s, 
because the pursuit of “shareholder value’ is closely associated with the short-termism of non-financial corporations 
(Boyer, 2000; Grahl Teague, 2000; Aglietta, 2000; Aglietta and Breton, 2001), and Lazonick and O’Sullivan (2000) have 
perceptively shown the connections between shareholder value and company downsizing throughout the neoliberal phase 
of capitalist development (Lapavitsas, 2011). 
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financial investment opportunities. This puts the emphasis on other transformations of the capitalist 
system in its neo-liberal phase, which have been in part gathered under the label of financialization.  
Today the term financialization may be used to refer to three different, even though interconnected, 
phenomena. The first is the reduction of reliance on bank loans by large non-financial corporations 
and their growing autonomous ability to raise funds in financial markets. The second is the expansion 
of banks’ mediating activities in financial markets and their tendency to lend mainly to households. 
The third is the increasing involvement of households in the financial markets, as both borrowers and 
asset holders (Orhangazi, 2008; Lapavitsas, 2011; Scarano, 2019). Financialisation may be 
scrutinized both at a macroeconomic level and at a corporate (micro) level. As regards the former, 
financialisation in practice simply becomes synonymous with the expanding financial sector within 
the economic system. This expansion of financial markets in one of the main characteristic of the 
neo-liberal era and it has been mostly due to innovations in securitization and credit enhancement, 
which have favoured new trading strategies (Bodie et al., 2014). As to the latter (i.e. corporate level), 
it can highlight the changes in the behaviours of the managers of non-financial corporations and their 
new relations with the financial markets; that is, the adoption of shareholder value orientation by them 
associated to increasing investments in financial assets (Stochammer, 2004a, 2004b)12.   
These structural transformations are among the main results of  the previously examined evolution in 
corporate governance, which have produced radical changes in the objectives of top managements, 
favouring an increasing propensity to substitute real investment with short-term financial investment 
in the process of corporate investment decision-making in order promote the ‘pursuit of shareholder 
value’. In fact, according to Sawyer (2017) and Scarano (2019, p. 20) “financialisation has changed 
the relations between the financial sector and the real sector precisely because the passing of 
ownership of non-financial corporations into the hands of money managers has itself, in turn, fuelled 
the pursuit of this objective”. In pursuit of higher quarterly earnings per share, American companies 
have conducted great stock repurchases to increase their own corporations’ stock prices (Lazonick, 
2013). In this way, trillions of dollars have been subtracted from real investments and job creation 
over more than three decades.   
In compliance with Minsky (1993a,b, 1996) Stockhammer (2004a and 2006) has stressed that this 
phenomenon is an important factor in the slowdown of accumulation13, not because investment in 
financial assets is necessarily in conflict with physical investment, but because it is a symptom of the 
changes in management strategies, closely connected with a change in the institutional setting of the 
firms. This aspect, therefore, could also be viewed as a symptom of money managers capitalism. As 
pointed out above, in the same period the non-financial corporations (NFC), while reducing their 
                                                          
12 In the last three decades, in fact, a new kind of phenomenon has been powerfully emerging. Mainly in the US, but also 
in continental Europe: i.e. non-financial corporations (NFCs) have been increasingly investing in financial assets and 
creating own financial subsidiaries, deriving increasing shares of their income from this kind of pure financial activities 
(Stockhammer, 2004a; Orhangazi, 2008). In the same period, NFCs have increased transfers of earnings to the financial 
markets in the forms of interest payments, dividend payments and, mainly, stock buybacks. 
13 As pointed out by Scarano (2019, p. 13): “a marked slowdown in accumulation was experienced by most OECD 
countries from the 1960s to the 1990s. The growth rates of non-residential business capital stock, which is a measure of 
productive capacity of a country and is closely correlated with its GDP, reached their lowest points between the first half 
of the 1980s and the middle of the 1990s in most European countries and the United States. In the USA, the UK and Italy 
non-residential business capital accumulation saw a slight increase in the second half of the 1990s, but this was not the 




accumulation of capital goods, progressively increased their financial investment (Stockhammer, 
2004). Accumulation, while picking up again thereafter, never got back to the levels of the previous 
Fordist period, and non-financial corporations have continued to invest heavily in financial 
instruments (Stockhammer, 2004b) and that, even after the 2008 great financial crisis.  
Successively to financial liberalization, in fact, NFCs have been facing portfolio choice problems in 
their investment decisions between fixed and financial assets and increasing availability of alternative 
financial investments can channel NFCs’ retained earnings to short-term financial portfolios instead 
of long-term real investments. 
 
 
4. The threats of global money manager capitalism  
 
Minsky (1996) has concentrated his analysis on the effect of the new power of the money manager in 
increasing sensitivity of firm to stock market valuation and the threat of takeover, just at the time 
when all economies were opening up to a wider, world competition. 
As everybody knows, there are a number of different ways to define globalization, each of which 
underlines different aspects of a progressive worldwide integration process between people, 
companies, and governments. However, here I prefer to confine my attention to its major economic 
features, which can be summarised as free trade improvement and a progressive worldwide 
liberalization of the capital movements.  Free trade has been only partially implemented under the 
umbrella of the WTO, with many surviving tariff regimes, and countless nontariff barriers particularly 
nowadays14.  Mainstream literature very often has outlined the successful of free and globalized 
movements of capital. According to neoclassical theory, free capital flows should only be a form of 
intertemporal trade and then their functioning rules should be no different from those of free trade. 
Thus, free flows of external capital should contribute to smoothing consumption and production 
paths, improving social welfare. By contrast Minsky was not soo optimistic. He outlined indeed that 
capital account liberalization was the theoretical field where economics largely failed in explaining 
events in the real world like financial crisis and debt-deflation. Free movements of short-term capital, 
such as portfolio flows and short-term bank loans, have so far been related to a long series of serious 
economic and financial crises because of their volatility and exposure to surges in and sudden 
withdrawals from the financial markets.  Thus, successively to economic and financial crises in Asia, 
Latin America and Russia in the late 1990s, some economists underlined the possible dangerous 
effects of these kinds of capital movements for developing countries. Instead, long-term capital flows, 
such as FDI, were usually regarded as more positive for the long-term economic growth of developing 
countries, because they are generally more stable and can improve their production capacity and 
technology (Stiglitz, 2000 and 2018).  
Thus, the economic literature analysing the effects of liberalization of capital flows on the developing 
countries usually highlights the difference between short-term and long-term flows.  However, 
following the observations by Scarano (2019), free movements of capital can produce significant 
effects on the developed economies, too. Much less analysis has been dedicated to these effects, but 
                                                          
14 While writing this paper this situation seems to be changing since President Trump has implemented further tariffs 
and barriers on US trade to cope with international competition and he has opened the door to the so-called “trade-war”. 
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they can play a major role in producing the present tendency to stagnation in this kind of economies, 
and they are closely connected with another major phenomenon of our time: financialisation by non-
financial corporations, which can greatly contribute to reducing their real investment in the developed 
countries, contributing to decreasing their growth rate and increasing their unemployment rate.  
In this context, however, the distinction between short-term and long-term capital flows can be less 
evident and significant. Free movements of capital, moreover, can play a major role in financialisation 
of NFC from two different points of view.  If real investment depends on the term structure of interest 
rates over the full range of financial and real investment opportunities, then real investments in the 
developed countries also depend on the differential between their rates of returns and the rates of 
returns on real investments in the developing or emerging countries. However, this differential does 
not only act by means of FDI, but also by means of the possibility of financial investment in foreign 
securities, associated with real investment in foreign countries. Financial globalization, multiplying 
the potential range of financial instruments available to big corporations’ portfolios and creating new 
ways to indirectly access the high profits produced in the emergent markets, can play a major role in 
changing the portfolio composition. Moreover, the managers of “financialised nonfinancial 
corporations” can decide to substitute direct national real investments with financial investments in 
foreign corporations, thus also obtaining a greater liquidity for their portfolios.   
Furthermore, financial investments by non-financial corporations are usually very different from the 
traditional forms of takeover and corporate holding because their profitability depends not only on 
the ratio between profits and invested capital, but also on the terms of capitalisation of the expected 
future profits realised through the financial markets. Thus, the growing liquidity of non-financial 
corporations’ portfolios can contribute to heightening the usual volatility of the rates of return on 
financial assets as well as the vulnerability to contagion-induced financial shocks (cf. Scarano, 2019). 
Moreover, countries with a large financial sector have a riskier financial account structure, compared, 
for instance, with commodity-exporting countries, which show a safer financial account structure.  
All this obviously increases the overall uncertainty of financial investment profitability itself. And 
this growing uncertainty, in turn, leads to a greater tendency to money hoarding by non-financial 
corporations that crowded out real investments. Thus, the relation between fixed investment, 
uncertainty, increasing integration of international capital markets, the widening gap between real 
and financial sector transactions and corporate portfolio choice seems to be a very important factor.  
The analysis of  the evolution of capitalism by Minsky (at the end of his life) was then striking and 
longsighted since he observed, well in advance, and stressed rightly that money-manager capitalism 
was becoming global and that a further international economic and financial integration would take 
place in the years ahead; "managed money capitalism is international in both the funds and the assets 
of the funds” (Minsky 1990a, 71) and "global financial integration is likely to characterize the next 
era of expansive capitalism. The problem of finance that will emerge is whether the financial and 
fiscal control and support institutions of national governments can contain both the consequences of 
global financial fragility and an international debt deflation" (Minsky 1995b, p. 93) 
This insight by Minsky's theory of capitalist development suggests therefore that a sixth economic 
stage might now be emerging. This suggestion comes from the fact that national and international 
entities have recently sought to contain the global financial crisis and particularly to cope with the 







In this paper I have tried to show how both Schumpeter’s and Minsky's theory of capitalist 
development continue to guide us and challenge us to explore important questions on the evolution 
of capitalism. Nevertheless I have discussed how these two giants of economic thought have analysed 
the evolution of capitalism with different results. 
On one hand, Schumpeter in his 1942 book, stressed that in the latest stages of capitalist evolution, 
entrepreneuship would have been in impasse, and he has forecast that a socialist form of society will 
inevitably emerge from an equally inevitable decomposition of capitalist society; on the other hand, 
Minsky made it clear that the evolution of the capitalist systems is not necessary a progressive 
process. Indeed, as I have showed in this paper, money manager capitalism and the global 
financialisation process inspired by the neoliberal paradigm, may represent serious threats to the 
system itself. 
To analyse each stage of capitalist development following Minsky’s perspective, one  should ask 
what is the distinctive activity being financed, what is the pivotal source of financing, and what is the 
balance of economic power between those in business and in banking/finance activity. Capitalist 
development is shaped by the institutional structure, but this structure is always evolving in response 
to profit-seeking activity. The financial system takes on special importance in this theory not only 
because finance exerts a strong influence on business activity but also because this system is 
particularly prone to innovation. 
In the last section of this paper I have outlined that, developing Minsky's theory more thoroughly, 
might also involve explorations of the deep financial globalization process. This scrutinity may 
indeed justify the analysis of a sixth-stage in capitalism evolution that is:  global financial money-
manager capitalism. 
Summing up, if Minsky’s and Schumpeter’s views have tried to understand the economic behavior  
of capitalist economies as evolving entities, their perspectives will continue to guide and challenge 
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